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Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency comes of age – new times or 
new paradigms 
 
This year (2018) the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency comes of age and celebrates its 21st 
birthday.  It has been something of a success internationally.  The major common law jurisdictions 
including the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US), Canada and Australia have changed 
their domestic laws on cross-border insolvency cooperation based on the model law provisions and 
so too has Japan and Korea.1  But the emerging global super powers of China and India have 
remained resistant and so too have most of the European Union (EU) member states including the 
economic power houses of France and Germany.  Nevertheless, the number of international 
acceptances is growing slowly including most recently Singapore. India is also in the process of 
considering whether to join the Model Law, with the Government of India having recently issued a 
draft chapter to be included in the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016.2   This paper critically 
assesses the basic paradigm of cross-border insolvency cooperation as reflected in the Model Law, 
its potential as a vehicle for harmonisation and its limits of facilitating such cross-border 
cooperation.3  
After this first introductory part, the paper is divided as follows.  Part 2 asks what is meant by cross-
border cooperation in respect of insolvency matters; in other words, what forms may cooperation 
take and what is the role of the Model law in such cooperation?  Part 3 considers why certain 
economically significant States have, or have not, adopted the Model Law.  Particular reference is 
made to Singapore as it is a major financial centre in Asia that has recently adopted the Model Law, 
and to China given its economic significance and the fact that it has not yet adopted the Model Law. 
References are also made to the US and the UK as they are early Model Law adopters. Part 4 
addresses key variances in the context of implementation of the Model Law and which are major 
factors for States to consider in the process of adoption; namely (a) reciprocity; (b) relevant 
proceedings for the purpose of providing cooperation; (c) avenues for extending cooperation; (d) 
treatment of foreign creditors and (e) application of foreign law.  Part 5 considers future prospects 
for the Model Law regime and Part 6 concludes. 
                                                            
1  See UNCITRAL, ‘UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (1997)’ 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model.html.  For analyses of the Model Law 
by those involved in its drafting – see A Berends, “UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: A 
Comprehensive Overview’” (1998) 6 Tulane Journal of International & Comparative Law 309; J Clift, “The 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: A Legislative Framework to Facilitate Coordination and 
Cooperation” (2004) 12 Tulane Journal of International & Comparative Law 307 and see generally I Mevorach, 
“Modified Universalism as Customary International Law” (2018) 96 Texas law Review; “On the Road to 
Universalism: A Comparative and Empirical Study of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency”  
(2011) 12 European Business Organization Law Review 517; C Mohan, “Cross-border Insolvency Problems: 
Is the UNCITRAL Model Law the Answer?” (2012) 21 International Insolvency Review 199; JL Westbrook, 
“Global Insolvency Proceedings for a Global Market” (2018) 96 Texas Law Review. 
2  Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Government of India, ‘Insolvency Section File No. 30/27/2018’ (2018), 
<www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/PublicNoiceCrossBorder_20062018.pdf> accessed 17 August 2018. 




2. Forms of Cross-Border Cooperation 
In respect of insolvency matters, cooperation between States may take many forms.  One might 
distinguish between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ forms of cooperation, though these terms do not have any 
precise meaning.  A related distinction is that between procedural and substantive cooperation. 
 
At a first basic level, the State extending cooperation or assistance may simply be recognising 
the authority of a foreign insolvency representative to speak for the debtor or giving the insolvency 
representative standing before the domestic courts.  At a second, somewhat more advanced, level, 
it may mean making certain orders at the request of the foreign representative and there may be a 
greater or lesser amount of automaticity involved in the making of these orders. At a third still more 
advanced level, it may mean enforcing a foreign order handed down in the course of foreign 
insolvency proceedings under which a contractual counterparty or defendant is ordered to pay a 
sum of money or restore property to the debtor. 
 
The Model Law addresses the first two levels of cooperation between States and partially 
addresses the third level. When the Model Law was first conceived, its aim was to provide a 
framework for countries to adopt so as to obtain consistency in the recognition of foreign insolvency 
proceedings and granting relief in aid of the foreign courts, giving foreign creditors or foreign 
representatives access to local courts and cooperation between courts in countries where the 
debtor’s assets are located. Thus, the Model Law facilitates, to the maximum extent possible, the 
optimal management of cross-border insolvency so as to benefit debtors, creditors and other 
stakeholders as well as the economies in which these stakeholders function.  
 
An assessment of the Model Law must be made in the context of the theoretical framework of 
cooperation in international insolvency law. The existing literature acknowledges two broad extreme 
dichotomies: universality and territoriality.4 The more modern, universalist, principle is premised on 
the view that only the courts of the debtor’s ‘home jurisdiction’ should have control of, and 
administer, the debtor’s assets, and that there should only be one governing law. In contrast, the 
traditional, territorialist principle is one where each country only has jurisdiction over the portion of 
the debtor’s assets within its territory. Thus there will be multiple proceedings if the debtor’s assets 
are located in multiple jurisdictions, and there is no obligation to recognise proceedings in the other 
jurisdictions. Scholars have considered the advantages and disadvantages of either approach.5 In 
practice, particularly in the last decade, many States (such as the UK, the US and Singapore) have 
                                                            
4  Jay L. Westbrook, ‘Memorandum’ (written to the United States National Bankruptcy Review 
Commission, Re: UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 1998) 
<http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/report/e1.pdf> accessed 31 July 2018.   
5  See e.g. ibid; Ian F. Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law (2nd edn, OUP  2005) 13. 
  
moved away from a largely territorialist stance and have adopted various degrees of more 
universalist approaches.6  
 
The Model Law adopts a ‘modified universalist’ principle.7 It allows for the opening of more than 
one set of insolvency proceedings, particularly in States where the debtor has a business presence, 
and aims to strive for maximum cooperation and coordination among the various proceedings.  To 
this end, the Model Law provides for four main elements in relation to the conduct of cross-border 
insolvency cases: access, recognition, relief (assistance) and cooperation.8 The access provisions 
allow the foreign insolvency representative a right of access to the local court. The recognition 
provisions enable the court to recognise foreign proceedings either as a ‘foreign main proceeding’ 
or a ‘foreign non-main proceeding’. The relief provisions allow the court to grant relief to assist in a 
foreign insolvency proceeding, The extent of the relief depends on whether the foreign proceedings 
are ‘foreign main proceeding’, which allows for an automatic stay of actions against the debtor and 
its assets, or whether it is a ‘foreign non-main proceeding’, where more limited and discretionary 
relief is available. The cooperation provisions permit cooperation and direct communication between 
the local court and the foreign court or foreign insolvency representatives, and also establish the 
coordination that is required for the management of concurrent proceedings.  The aim is to “foster 
decisions that would best achieve the objectives of both proceedings”.9 
 
We now explain how States may cooperate in cross-border insolvency and the relevance of the 
Model Law in such cooperation. 
 
2A. Standing of foreign representative in the domestic courts 
 
 
At the first level, the Model Law contain provisions entitling a foreign representative to apply 
directly to local courts without seeking any additional form of authorisation; to apply for the opening 
of local insolvency proceedings and also to participate in other local proceedings that involve the 
debtor.10  There are also provisions on cooperation and communication between foreign 
                                                            
6  ibid. 
7  See Jay L. Westbrook, ‘National Regulation of Multinational Default’ in Mario Monti et al. (eds), 
Economic Law and Justice in Times of Globalisation: Festschrift For Carl Baudenbacher (Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft 2007).  But see Sefa Franken, “Cross-Border Insolvency Law: A Comparative Institutional 
Analysis” (2014) 34 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 97 taking a somewhat minority view that the Model Law 
reflects a cooperative territorialist approach. 
8  UNCITRAL, ‘Guide to Enactment and Interpretation of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency’ (2013) (Revised Guide), para 24. See discussion relating to the Revised Guide below, notes [ ]-[ 
] and accompanying text.  
9  Revised Guide, para 42. 
10  Model Law, arts 9 (direct access), 11 (commencement of local insolvency proceedings) and 12 (other 
proceedings). 
  
representatives and local courts11; on inter-court cooperation and communication and on 
coordination between courts in relation to concurrent proceedings affecting the same debtor.12 
 
One might however distinguish between these forms of cooperation and that of merely 
recognising the authority of the foreign representative as the person duly qualified to speak on behalf 
of the debtor under the law applicable to the debtor; i.e. as the appropriate constitutional organ.  A 
corporate debtor owes its existence to the law of the State where it was incorporated. For countries 
that apply so-called ‘incorporation theory’ to legal persons, the law applicable to the internal affairs 
of the legal entity, including entitlement to represent the entity, is that of the State of incorporation.  
The position is slightly different for countries that apply the ‘real seat’ theory of incorporation.  For 
these countries the law applicable is that of the ‘real seat’ and the ‘real seat’ should correspond with 
the place of incorporation.  On strict versions of this theory, if a legal entity moves its real seat 
without reincorporating in the ‘new’ jurisdiction, then the entity loses its legal personality.13 
 
The incorporation/real seat split appears to have some echoes in the common law/civil law 
divide, in that common law countries follow the incorporation doctrine and most, though not all, civil 
law countries follow the real set approach.  The civil law exceptions include the Netherlands and a 
recent significant case in the Netherlands highlights important issues at the intersection between 
the law of legal personality and cross border insolvency law.14  The case arose out of insolvency 
proceedings in Russia involving the major Russian oil conglomerate – Yukos.  Yukos, a Russian 
legal entity, had assets in the Netherlands and the question arose whether the Yukos administrator 
appointed in the course of the Russian insolvency proceedings had any authority over those Dutch 
assets.  The Netherlands has not adopted the Model Law and applies more a territorialist, rather 
than a universalist approach, towards insolvency proceedings.  The authority of a liquidator or other 
insolvency representative is generally limited to assets within the State under whose law the 
insolvency representative was appointed.  The Dutch Supreme Court15 however, was able to 
overcome some of the limitations of the territorial approach by holding that Russian law, as the law 
of the state where the legal entity was incorporated, governed who could speak for that legal entity 
and under Russian law it was the insolvency administrator in this particular matter.16 
                                                            
11  Model Law, arts 25 and 26. 
12  Model Law, arts 28-30. 
13   See Stephan  Rammeloo, Corporations in Private International Law (OUP, 2001) 11-16 and for the 
meaning of ‘real seat’ see A Modem Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe: A Consultative 
Document of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts (2002)  <http://ec.europa.eu/internal-
market/company/docs/modern/consulten.pdf> accessed 23 August 2018, 32 – 33.   
 
14  For an overview of Dutch cross border insolvency law, see inter alia: Michael Veder, Cross-Border 
Insolvency Proceedings and Security Rights (Kluwer Legal Publishers, 2004) ch II; Bob Wessels, International 
Insolvency Law, (4th edn, Kluwer 2015) ch II. 
15  Supreme Court Decision of 13th September 2013, ECLI: NL: HR: 2013: BZ5668.  For a translation of 
the decision see <www.insol.org/emailer/Oct_2013_downloads/Yukos%20decision%20e%20translation.pdf> 
accessed 15 August 2018. 
16    This is somewhat an oversimplification of a complex ruling.  See generally on the decision Barbar 





2B. Making orders at the request of the foreign representative 
 
The second level of cooperation entails making certain orders at the request of the foreign 
representative, including on an interim basis, pending a full adversary court hearing.  The approach 
adopted by the Model Law is to distinguish between main and secondary foreign proceedings.  Main 
proceedings take place where the debtor has its centre of main interests (COMI) and secondary 
(non-main) proceedings where the debtor has an establishment.  With an order of the court 
recognising foreign main proceedings, there are certain prima facie consequences.17  These are a 
stay on individual proceedings against the debtor’s assets, though the apparent breadth of this 
prohibition is qualified in various respects;18 a stay on executions against the debtor’s assets and 
finally, the debtor’s right to transfer, encumber or otherwise dispose of any its assets is generally 
suspended subject to whatever limitations that are part and parcel of domestic insolvency law.19  It 
is important to note however, that these effects may be modified or adjusted to suit the 
circumstances of a particular case.  For instance, the prima facie stay only bars legal proceedings 
against the debtor.  It does not bar steps being taken to enforce security rights in respect of the 
debtor’s property which do not involve the commencement of legal proceedings  
There are no prima facie consequences associated with the making of an order recognising non-
main proceedings though all the consequences that prima facie apply with the recognition of main 
proceedings can also be made applicable in this connection.20 
Whatever the nature of the foreign proceedings, the court may ‘co-operate’ with the foreign 
representative in the form of orders providing for the examination of witnesses, the taking of 
evidence or the delivery of information concerning the debtor’s assets, affairs, rights, obligations or 
liabilities.21 It may also grant ‘turnover’ relief - entrusting the administration or realisation of all or 
part of the debtor’s assets to the foreign representative or another person designated by the court.22  
Finally, there is a general catch all provision enabling the court to grant any further relief that might 
be available to an insolvency office holder in domestic proceedings.23 
 
 
                                                            
International Corporate Rescue 112.  In later proceedings,  the Amsterdam Court of Appeals ruled in May 
2017 that the Russian liquidation order in respect of Yukos was contrary to Dutch public order and therefore 
null and void -  Amsterdam Court of Appeals, May 9 2017, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2017:1495.  Consequently and 
necessarily, the Russian insolvency representative was not entitled to represent Yukos in the Netherlands.  
17 Article 20(1). 
18 Art 20(3) permits proceedings to be taken to the extent necessary to preserve a claim. 
19 Article 20(2). 
20 Article 21(1). 
21 All these matters are spelled out in Article 21(1). 
22 Article 21(2). 
23 Article 21(1)(g). 
  
2C. Enforcement of monetary orders made in the course of foreign insolvency 
proceedings 
 
The third level of co-operation – enforcement of monetary orders made in the course of foreign 
insolvency proceedings - is not addressed specifically in the Model Law though Article 26 refers to 
cooperation to the ‘maximum extent possible’ and Article 27 refers to cooperation being 
implemented ‘by any appropriate means’.24  In Rubin v Eurofinance SA25 the UK Court of Appeal 
took the view that ‘cooperation “to the maximum extent possible” included enforcement since 
enforcement of foreign judgments could take place under the common law’.26 The UK Supreme 
Court however, rejected the argument that one could infer that enforcement was permissible under 
the Model Law though a process of implication from the legislative language. The matter had not 
been addressed explicitly in the Model Law despite the fact that recognition and enforcement were 
fundamental in international cases. Lord Collins said:27 ‘It would be surprising if the Model Law was 
intended to deal with judgments in insolvency matters by implication. Articles 21, 25 and 27 are 
concerned with procedural matters. No doubt they should be given a purposive interpretation and 
should be widely construed in the light of the objects of the Model Law, but there is nothing to 
suggest that they apply to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments against third 
parties.’ 
US commentators have been critical of the Rubin case and other UK interpretations of the Model 
Law provisions suggesting that the UK courts have added a ‘barrier of anachronistic principles’.28  
In Rubin, the UK Supreme Court reaffirmed the traditional common law rules for the enforcement of 
foreign monetary judgments.  It was held that such a foreign judgment was only enforceable in the 
UK if the defendant was either present in the relevant foreign jurisdiction or had in some way 
submitted to that jurisdiction.29 The court however, took a broad approach to what constituted 
                                                            
24 Although recognition is required in order to enforce an insolvency-related judgment, not all recognized 
judgments will require enforcement to be effective. The term “enforcement” goes beyond what might be 
required to make the judgment effective in the recognizing State, and focuses on compelling compliance with, 
or observance of, the judgment by the judgment debtor. 
25 [2010] EWCA Civ 895; [2011] Ch 133, CA. 
26 [2010] EWCA Civ 137; [2011] Ch 33 at para [63]. 
27 [2012] UKSC 46; [2013] 1 AC 236 at para [143]. 
28 See L Clark and D Glosband, “Views from the United States of America” in INSOL International, The 
Implications of Brexit for the Restructuring and Insolvency Industry: A Collection of Essays (London, 2017) 70 
at 72 and see also J Westbrook, “Ian Fletcher and the Internationalist Principle” (2015) 3 NIBLeJ 565: “Despite 
our high and continuing respect for the British courts, many of us on the west side of the Atlantic have been 
distressed by In re Rubin and its progeny” and also J Westbrook, “Interpretation Internationale” (2015) 87 
Temple Law Review 739. For different perspectives on the US/UK judicial divide see A Walters, “Giving Effect 
to Foreign Restructuring Plans in Anglo-US Private International Law” (2015) 3 NIBLeJ 375; Modified 
Universalism & The Role of Local Legal Culture in the making of Cross-Borders Insolvency Law (2019) 93 
Am Bankr LJ ; S Block-Lieb, “Reaching to Restructure across Borders (without over-Reaching), Even after 
Brexit” (2018) 92 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 1. 
 
 
29 Rule 43 in Dicey, Morris and Collins, Conflict of Laws (15th edn, 2012) at para 14R-054. The Dicey 
  
‘submission’ stating that whether there was a submission was to be inferred from all the facts and it 
included acts such as lodging a proof in the foreign insolvency proceedings.30 
The court refused to countenance an insolvency ‘carve-out’ – some sort of special rules for 
insolvency-related judgments or judgments handed down in the course of insolvency proceedings 
though on a practical level it conceded that an insolvency ‘carve out’ was feasible.  For example, 
under the European Insolvency Regulation (EIR)31, the courts in an EU Member State where the 
debtor has either its ‘centre of main interests’ (COMI) or an ‘establishment’ may open main or 
secondary insolvency proceedings, as the case may be, in respect of the debtor and the State that 
opens insolvency proceedings also has jurisdiction in respect of insolvency-related actions affecting 
the debtor.32  There is now a developed body of jurisprudence as to what is an ‘insolvency-related’ 
action and the notion includes so-called transactional avoidance actions i.e. actions setting aside 
certain pre-insolvency transactions such as gifts or transactions at an undervalue that unfairly 
advantage either the recipient of the gift or the particular creditor and cause disadvantage to the 
general body of creditors.33 The Supreme Court however, rejected application of this jurisprudence 
to create special insolvency norms for the recognition of foreign judgments.  The Supreme Court 
also rejected a proposed test that would allow for the recognition of foreign judgments if a defendant 
was deemed to have sufficient connections with the relevant foreign jurisdiction.  The court seemed 
to think that such a test would be too imprecise and uncertain, and might cause UK defendants in 
marginal cases to defend foreign actions that they might otherwise ignore with consequent 
detrimental effects for UK businesses.34   
The general common law rules, reaffirmed in Rubin, for the recognition of foreign judgments may 
be time-honoured or, to put it less kindly, ‘anachronistic’, but the existing Model Law does not 
provide expressly for the replacement of such rules.  In fact, UNCITRAL is now working on a new 
instrument to tackle this topic - a model law for the cross-border recognition and enforcement of 
insolvency-related judgments.35  The perceived need for a new instrument implicitly acknowledges 
                                                            
rule is discussed in Rubin at paras 7–10. 
30 [2012] UKSC 46, [2013] 1 AC 236 at paras [161-167]. See also on submission Stichting Shell 
Pensioenfonds v Krys [2014] UKPC 41, [2015] AC 616 at paras [31] and [32], including the statement at 
para [31]: 2A submission may consist in any procedural step consistent only with acceptance of the rules 
under which the court operates.” 
31 Regulation 2015/848 ‘recasting’ Regulation 1346/2000/ 
32 Article 6 Regulation 2015/848. 
33 Leading cases include Gourdain v Nadler Case 133/78 [1979] 3 CMLR 180, Seagon v Deko Case C-
339/07 [2009] ECR I-767 and Nickel and Goeldner Spedition GmbH v ‘Kintra’ UAB Case C-157/13, [2015] 
QB 96 and see generally G McCormack, “Reconciling European Conflicts and Insolvency Law” (2014) 15 
European Business Organization Law Review 309. 
34 [2012] UKSC 46, [2013] 1 AC 236 at para [130]. Lord Collins pointed out at para 128 that ”typically today 
the introduction of new rules for enforcement of judgments depends on a degree of reciprocity. The EC 
Insolvency Regulation and the Model Law were the product of lengthy negotiation and consultation.” 
35 See http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups.html on the UNCITRAL website and 
for the latest published draft see A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.145 - Recognition and enforcement of insolvency-
related judgments: draft model law 
  
the fact that enforcement of judgments is a form of enhanced cooperation outside the boundaries 
of the present Model Law.36 
 
3. Reasons for Implementation or Non-implementation of Implementing (or 
Not Implementing) the Model Law 
 
3A. Signalling factor 
There are various interrelated reasons why States may choose to adopt the Model Law.  At the most 
fundamental level, the State may simply wish to improve its legal framework for dealings with cross 
border insolvency cases.  But it may also wish to project a positive international image – forward 
looking, outward facing and progressive.  In doing so, the State may enhance its visibility and appeal 
as a global centre for debt restructuring and creating imaginative solutions to problems affecting 
cross-border groups. For example, in the case of Singapore’s decision to adopt the Model Law, the 
2016 Report of the Committee on Singapore as an International Centre for Debt Restructuring37 
and more extensively, the 2013 Insolvency Law Review Committee Report38  explained the reasons 
in detail. The 2016 Report referenced the provision of a clear and internationally recognised 
framework for resolving cross-border insolvencies39 while the 2013 Rreport talked about a firmer 
and more predictable platform for cross-border cooperation in insolvency matters.  It said that the  
‘increased certainty and cooperation will in many cases lead to a greater predictability of process 
and outcome, which in many cases may possibly help lower the risks and costs of international 
financing, reduce the overall cost of insolvency litigation, and reduce the overall costs of obtaining 
recoveries or dividends from the cross-border insolvency process. It may also influence foreign 
investment in Singapore favourably.’40  
The 2016 Report further referred to the fact the Model Law was the international benchmark and 
there was no multilateral convention on cross-border insolvency that could appropriately be adopted 
                                                            
36  See generally INSOL International Impact of Rubin v Eurofinance on Cross-border Insolvency Recognition 
and Enforcement (London, August 2017) at p 7: “Recognition of a foreign judgment requires that the rendering 
court have jurisdiction. Whether jurisdiction exists under the rendering court’s own law typically is decided by 
the rendering court. One state’s rules on jurisdiction, however, are not binding on another state’s decision to 
recognize the judgment, as the question of whether the assertion of jurisdiction is sufficient for purposes of 
recognition may be addressed independently by the enforcing court. Most enforcement treaties contain rules 
on indirect jurisdiction, and many lay out relatively detailed lists of required bases for enforcement. As with 
any legal regime, each country’s bankruptcy laws reflect local public policy choices and, therefore, can be 
very different from one another.” 
37  Committee to Strengthen Singapore as an International Centre for Debt Restructuring, Report of the 
Committee (Ministry of Law, 2016) < 
www.mlaw.gov.sg/content/dam/minlaw/corp/News/Report%20of%20the%20Committee.pdf> accessed 23 
August 2018 (2016 Report). 
38  Insolvency Law Review Committee, Report of the Insolvency Law Review Committee: Final Report 
(Ministry of Law, 2013) 
<https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/content/dam/minlaw/corp/News/Revised%20Report%20of%20the%20Insolvency
%20Law%20Review%20Committee.pdf> accessed 23 August 2018 (2013 Report). 
39 Para 3.27. 




for this purpose. The enactment of the Model Law was a more prominent and outward facing 
international milestone even though the Singapore courts have in recent years been particularly 
active in pushing forward the boundaries of judicial cooperation in cross border insolvencies and 
restructurings.   
In creative judicial hands, the common law may be a sufficiently flexible and accommodating tool 
that can be developed to accomplish many of the practical legal measures envisaged by the Model 
Law.  For instance, in the Cambridge Gas Transport Corporation v Official Committee of Unsecured 
Creditors (of Navigator Holdings Plc)Cambridge Gas case 41 Lord Hoffmann suggested that the 
‘common law has traditionally taken the view that fairness between creditors requires that, ideally, 
bankruptcy proceedings should have universal application. There should be a single bankruptcy in 
which all creditors are entitled and required to prove. No one should have an advantage because 
he happens to live in a jurisdiction where more of the assets or fewer of the creditors are situated.’42 
Certainly Lord Hoffmann has pushed forward the boundaries of common law creativity in the cross-
border insolvency sphere.  For instance, in Re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd43 he 
suggested that at common law, the English courts might recognise foreign insolvency proceedings 
taking place where a corporate debtor had its COMI as distinct from where it was incorporated, if 
the two States were different. Lord Collins however, said in Rubin v Eurofinance SA that the 
formulation of a new rule for the identification of courts as courts of competent jurisdiction in respect 
of insolvency proceedings was a matter for the legislature and not for judicial innovation.44 The 
Singapore courts appears to have been more in tune with the approach of Lord Hoffmann rather 
than Lord Collins.  A case in point is Re Opti-Medix Ltd,45 where the court acknowledged that in 
cross-border insolvency, there has been a general movement away from the traditional, territorial 
focus on the interests of the local creditors, towards recognition that universal cooperation between 
jurisdictions was a necessary part of the contemporary world. As a consequence of a greater 
sensitivity for universalist notions in insolvency, there was also a greater readiness to go beyond 
traditional bases for recognising foreign insolvency proceedings. The court suggested that a 
liquidation in the place of incorporation ‘accords with legal logic’ but nevertheless, the place of 
incorporation may be an accident of many factors and far removed from the actual place of business. 
The court concluded that recognising the COMI as the place to conduct principal insolvency 
proceedings had much to be recommended for as a matter of practicality.  COMI was the place 
where the bulk of the business was carried out and provided a strong connecting factor. 
                                                            
41  Cambridge Gas Transport Corporation v Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (of Navigator 
Holdings Plc) [2007] 1 AC 508. 
42 See [16] of the judgment.  
43 [2008] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 WLR 852 [31]. 
44  [2012] UKSC 46, [2013] 1 AC 236 [129]. Lord Collins’ view was preferred in the Scottish case of Re 
Hooley -  Hooley Ltd v Ganges Jute Private [2016] CSOH 141 2016 Scot (D) 12/10.  
45 [2016] SGHC 108. See also another decision of the Singapore High Court in Re Gulf Pacific 
Shipping Ltd [2016] SGHC 287. 
  
Nevertheless, there may be limits to judicial innovation and the extent to which the common law 
might be developed to fill the territory occupied by the Model Law.  The UK Privy Council decision46 
in Singularis Holdings v PricewaterhouseCoopers47 shows the limits of the common law on judicial 
assistance in insolvency proceedings. It was held that under the principle of ‘modified universalism’, 
the court had the power to assist foreign liquidation proceedings though this power was subject to 
local law and local public policy. If there was no statute granting authorisation, the fact that local law 
might permit local insolvency practitioner to do certain things in the case of a domestic insolvency 
did not necessarily mean that a foreign insolvency practitioner could do the same or equivalent 
things. Moreover, in this particular case, a power under local law to require the production of 
information could not be exercised by the foreign liquidators because they had no such power under 
the law of the State where they were appointed. According to the Privy Council, the court could not 
be said to be ‘assisting’ the liquidators in carrying out their tasks under the relevant foreign law. 
On the other hand, and by way of comparison, under Article 21(g) of the Model Law, the court may 
make available to a foreign insolvency office holder, any additional relief that might be available to 
a local insolvency office holder in local proceedings.  Equality of treatment is the prevailing principle 
and the foreign insolvency practitioner is not necessarily limited to his powers under the relevant 
foreign law though it is undoubtedly a discretionary factor that might be taken into account by the 
local court in deciding what assistance to give. 
 
3B. Legal origins and path dependency48   
 
Not all economically significant States however, are sold on the benefits of the Model Law. For 
example, China has thus far not adopted the Model Law even though China is a UNCITRAL Member 
State and has sent representatives to attend previous discussions on the Model Law. 49 The law on 
                                                            
46 The UK Privy Council hears appears from certain British Commonwealth countries and British territories 
and dependencies outside the UK mainland.  These include appeals form leading ‘offshore’ financial centres 
such as Cayman Islands and British Virgin Islands.  For more information see the Privy Council website – 
www.jcpc.uk 
 
47 [2014] UKPC 36; [2015] 2 WLR 971. The decision was applied in Hong Kong in Joint Administrators 
of African Minerals Ltd v Madison Pacific Trust Ltd 2015 WL 9017 (CFI); [2015] HKEC 641. See also the 
comments of Laffoy J for the Supreme Court of Ireland in Re Dunne (a bankrupt) [2015] IESC 42 at [58] that 
as ‘was stated by the Privy Council in Singularis, this Court can only act within the limits of its own statutory 
and common law powers’. 
48 See generally for a discussion of path dependency in understanding how law and policy evolves differently 
in different countries see I Ramsay, “US Exceptionalism, Historical Institutionalism, and the Comparative 
Study of Consumer Bankruptcy Law”, (2015) 87 Temple Law Review 947;  O Hathaway, “Path Dependence 
in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System”, (2001) 86 Iowa Law Review 
601 (2001); J Bell, “Path Dependence and Legal Development”, (2013) 87 Tulane Law Review 787. 
49  See Rebecca Parry and Nan Gao,“The Future Direction of China's Cross‐border Insolvency Laws, 
Related Issues and Potential Problems” (2018) 27 International Insolvency Review 5. 
  
cross-border insolvency is primarily contained in Article 5 of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 200650 
(EBL), which is China’s modern rescue and reorganisation regulatory framework, and it has two 
aspects. The first allows for the Chinese insolvency representative to seek assets and cooperation 
abroad. The second, relating to treatment of inbound transactions, is not as comprehensive. Article 
5 of the EBL provides for the recognition and enforcement by a Chinese court of foreign judgments 
and rulings, subject to certain conditions, in two basic circumstances.  The first is where there is a 
treaty between China and the relevant foreign country providing for recognition and the second is a 
vaguer and more general provision making allowance for recognition, on an ad hoc basis, on the 
basis of reciprocity. China has not yet entered into any treaty relating to insolvency procedures, 
though China has entered into bilateral treaties with certain trading partners on enforcement of 
foreign judgments.51 It is reported however, that there are very few precedents on the recognition 
in the Chinese courts of foreign insolvency proceedings emanating from States with whom China 
has concluded such bilateral treaties.52 Other scholars have been more optimistic, arguing that the 
Chinese courts are likely to recognise the judgments from the courts of jurisdictions that would 
recognise their judgments, even if the laws of that jurisdictions do not expressly recognise 
reciprocity.53 Moreover, Article 5 does not deal with a full range of procedural cross-border 
insolvency issues and there are broad carve-outs for the courts not to grant recognition if it would 
otherwise violate China’s sovereignty, social security and public interests; or impair the legal interest 
and rights of Chinese creditors.54  
There may however, be other ways of cooperation via civil procedure rules in China. In Thumb 
Environmental Technology Group v Sino-Environmental Technology Group,55 the Supreme 
People’s Court recognised the power of a foreign representative (from Singapore) to represent a 
company in liquidation. The Chinese court held that the powers of the foreign representative were 
governed by the law of the place where the company was registered (which was Singapore). Its 
decision was reached, not on the basis of Article 5 of the EBL, but on the basis of Article 14 of the 
Chinese Law for Foreign-Related Civil Legal Relationships. 
Despite such indication that the Chinese courts are becoming more open to recognise foreign 
insolvency proceedings, scholars have argued that China is not likely to adopt the Model Law in the 
                                                            
50  Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 27, 
2006, effective June 1, 2007) (EBL), art 5. An English translation by the Chinese government is available at 
< http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2008-01/02/content_1388019.htm> accessed 23 August 2018.  
51  E.g. it is reported that China has concluded such bilateral treaties with more than 30 countries on civil 
and commercial matters, including France and Italy, but not with the UK or the US. See Naomi Moore, F Mark 
Fucci and Jingli Jiang, ‘China: Asia Pacific Restructuring Review 2018’ (Global Restructuring Review, 21 
September 2017) <https://globalrestructuringreview.com/insight/the-asia-pacific-restructuring-review-
2018/1147549/china> accessed 15 August 2018.  
52  ibid.  
53  See S Steele et al, “Trends and developments in Chinese insolvency law: the first decade 
of the PRC Enterprise Bankruptcy Law”, forthcoming in the American Journal of Comparative Law. 
54  EBL, art 5.  
55  [2014] No. 20 Final Judgment of the Fourth Civil Division of the Supreme People’s Court, translated 
copy available at <http://www.insol.org/emailer/Apr_2015_downloads/Document%209.pdf> accessed 15th 
August 2018. 
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near future for reasons that have been attributed to the civil law origins of the Chinese legal system 
(which do not favour ‘soft law’ instruments as opposed to treaties), the reluctance to follow a US-
led process of globalisation and the prevailing system of ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’  
that requires caution if there is any perceived surrender of the protection afforded Chinese 
creditors.56  
 
4. Differences in how Model Law is implemented in different States 
 
Additionally, given that the Model Law is ‘soft’ law, States which are considering whether to 
adopt the Model Law will find that there are variances in the way the Model Law is implemented 
among the other States. In particular, we focus on the following significant variations in 
implementation relating to (a) reciprocity and public policy; (b) relevant proceedings for the purpose 
of providing cooperation; (c) alternative avenues for providing cooperation; (d) treatment of foreign 
creditors and (e) application of foreign law.  
  
4A. Reciprocity and public policy 
 
 A central issue in the context of the Model Law is the possibility of a requirement of reciprocity – in 
other words Country X should recognise foreign proceedings in Country Y only if Country Y 
recognises proceedings from Country X. Reciprocity conditions are part of the insolvency laws in 
some countries. A glaring example is Article 5 of China’s Enterprise Bankruptcy Law.57  But such 
conditions limit the effectiveness of the Model Law and adversely affect the capacity of a country to 
project itself as outward facing and progressive.  A reciprocity requirement might be applied by a 
court on an ad hoc basis when considering the recognition of foreign proceedings – the approach 
in China.  Alternatively, it might be carried out by a government agency that is given the task of 
designating certain countries as having fulfilled reciprocity conditions. South Africa took this 
approach when adopting the Model law but in fact no countries have been so designated and 
consequently the Model Law is a dead letter as far as South Africa is concerned.58  
When Singapore was considering adopting the Model Law, the arguments for and against imposing 
a reciprocity requirement were hotly debated.  The Review Committee noted that many of the 
advantages flowing from the Model Law such as equality of treatment for local creditors; ‘ease of 
recovering assets from foreign jurisdictions and more efficient treatment of international insolvencies 
involving local businesses may come only if other countries also enact the Model Law or an 
                                                            
56  Parry and Gao, (n 45) . 
57 See generally E Lee "Problems of Judicial Recognition and Enforcement in Cross-Border Insolvency 
Matters Between Hong Kong and Mainland China" (2015) 63 American Journal of Comparative Law 439. 
58 Section 2 Cross-Border Insolvency Act 2000 and see generally A Smith and A Boraine, “Crossing Borders 
into South African Insolvency Law: From the Roman-Dutch Jurists to the UNCITRAL Model Law (2002) 10 
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 136. 
  
equivalent thereof.’59 The committee noted that the Model Law had not yet achieved totally 
widespread international adoption.  Nevertheless, the Committee were minded not to recommend 
any reciprocity obligation and its reasons for taking this viewpoint seem sound since the Model Law 
contains certain elements that protect local creditors and local public policy. 60  
 
Under Article 6 of the Model Law, a local court may refuse assistance in relation to foreign insolvency 
proceedings where assistance would be ‘manifestly’ contrary to the public policy of the local state.61 
Many common law countries including the UK and the US incorporated Article 6 in its original 
wording. Singapore however, adopted Article 6 without the word ‘manifestly’, as have Japan62 and 
South Korea63 and in Re Zetta Jets Pte Ltd, the Singapore High Court held that the threshold for 
invoking public policy is lower than that envisaged by the Model Law.64  
Generally, courts in both the US and UK have adopted the view that the public policy qualification 
on recognition and relief under the Model Law should be used restrictively and only in exceptional 
cases. 65 Such exceptional instances have however, arisen as in the UK case - Cherkasov v 
Olegovich, the Official Receiver of Dalnyaya Step LLC66 – where public policy was invoked in a 
situation involving a breach of natural justice and procedural unfairness. It seems that the foreign 
insolvency proceedings – Russian proceedings in this case - were part of an asset-stripping exercise 
by instrumentalities of the Russian State to nullify political opponents. Rose J said:67 “It is true that 
Article 6 is to be read restrictively and will only be relevant in a very small number of cases. But this 
case falls clearly within that small class.” 
 
                                                            
59 See p. 236 of the 2013 Report - Insolvency Law Review Committee, Report of the Insolvency Law Review 
Committee: Final Report (Ministry of Law, 2013). 
60 For a general discussion of the issues see pp. 236-238 of the 2013 Report. 
61  Model Law, art 6. 
62  Art 21(3) of the Japanese Law on Recognition of and Assistance in Foreign Insolvency Proceedings 
Law No. 129 of 2000 allows a court to refuse recognition of a foreign proceeding considered to be contrary to 
the public order or good public morals in Japan. See Shin Abe, ‘Japan’ in Look Chan Ho (ed), Cross Border 
Insolvency: A Commentary on the UNCITRAL Model Law (4th edn, Globe Law and Business 2017) 324. 
There is no mention of ‘manifestly’ in the Japanese legislation adopting the Model Law. 
63  See Article 632(2) of Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act (Act No. 7428, March 2005, as 
amended) (S. Korea) (DRBA) (providing that the court may dismiss the petition for recognition if the foreign 
bankruptcy proceeding is contrary to the public policy of the Republic of Korea). See Chiyong Rim, ‘South 
Korea’ in Look Chan Ho (ed),Cross Border Insolvency: A Commentary on the UNCITRAL Model Law ( 4th 
edn, Globe Law and Business 2017) 585.  
64  re Zetta Jets Pte Ltd [2018] SGHC 16, at [21] and [23]. 
65 Re Qimonda (2013) 737 F3d 14. See also the UU Congressional report on the new Chapter 15 of the US 
Bankruptcy Code which implements the UNCITRAL Model Law in the US  - HR Rep No 109-31 at para 109 
and see generally G McCormack, “US exceptionalism and UK localism? Cross Border insolvency law in 
comparative perspective” (2016) 36 Legal Studies 136.   
 
66 [2017] EWHC 756 (Ch); [2017] All ER (D) 11 (May). 
67 UNCITRAL itself has recognised, the “notion of public policy is based on national law and accordingly may 
differ from State to State” – see  “UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency Law with Revised Guide 
to Enactment and Interpretation” (2013) at para 101. 
  
Insolvency policies and procedures differ substantially between States and Lord Millett has 
observed that no branch of the law “is moulded more by considerations of national economic policy 
and commercial philosophy”.68 Differences between countries of even the same broad political 
outlook emerged in Re Toft,69 where the German courts had made an order providing for the 
interception of a bankrupt’s email and the question before both the UK and US courts was whether 
this order should be given effect. The English court recognised the German order holding that it was 
in the public interest to intercept the bankrupt’s communications.  Otherwise, bankrupts might be 
able to avoid paying their creditors and avoid court officers.70 On the other hand, the US court took 
the view that recognising the German order would be manifestly contrary to US public policy 
because it would infringe US constitutional safeguards protecting the safety of electronic 
communications. 
 
Other provisions in the Model Law may also be utilised to reflect public policy choices such as 
protecting local creditors and enforcing or denying the enforcement of foreign revenue debts. For 
example, Article 21(2) of the Model Law allows the recognition of the foreign proceeding to be 
modified, including in cases where the debtor’s property is handed over to the foreign 
representative. The court needs to be satisfied that the local creditors are ‘adequately protected’.71 
Similarly, under Article 22(1), the court in granting, modifying or denying relief, must be satisfied that 
the interests of the creditors and other interested persons are ‘adequately protected’. However, 
‘local creditors’ and ‘adequate protection’ are not defined in the Model Law and are left to the 
domestic courts’ interpretation. Japan also has a legislative tweak to Article 21 of the Model Law, 
providing that the court must be satisfied that ‘there is no likelihood of the interests of creditors in 
Japan being unreasonably prejudiced’,72 which gives rise to uncertainty as to whether the local 
courts may deny relief on the ground that the domestic creditors fare worse in foreign proceedings 
than in Japan 
 
4B. Proceedings to which the Model Law applies 
 
                                                            
68 P Millet, “Cross-border Insolvency: The Judicial Approach” (1997) 6 International Insolvency 
Review 99 at 109. 
69 In re Toft (2011) 453 BR 186. See also In re Gold & Honey Ltd (2009) 410 BR 357. 
70 Re a Bankrupt – Prager v Toft [2012] BPIR 469, citing Foxley v UK [2000] BPIR 1009. 
          71  While the US House of Representatives report on Chapter 15 – H Rep No 109–31 (2005) at p 106 states 
that Chapter 15 ‘largely tracks the language of the Model Law with appropriate United States references’ it 
replaces the words ‘adequately protected’ in the Model Law with ‘sufficiently protected’ in Chapter 15 so as 
to avoid confusion with a very specialised term in the US Bankruptcy Code – see s 361. 
 
72  Law on Recognition of and Assistance in Foreign Insolvency Proceedings, art 31(2). See also Kent 
Anderson, “Testing the Model Soft Law Approach to International Harmonisation: A Case Study Examining 
the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency” (2004) 23 Australian Yearbook of International Law 
1. 
  
The Model Law applies to collective judicial or administrative proceeding pursuant to a law relating 
to insolvency in which proceeding the assets and affairs of the debtor are subject to control or 
supervision by a foreign court, for the purpose of reorganization or liquidation.73 The so-called  
‘court’ may not strictly speaking be a court as such since the Model Law refers to a ‘judicial or other 
authority that can control or supervise’ proceedings.74 
The definition of collective insolvency proceedings covers both ‘debtor-in-possession’ restructuring 
regimes such as Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code 1978 and manger displacing regimes like 
company administration in the UK and judicial management in Singapore.75  
There are at least three issues with the general definition however, and different implementing 
States have tweaked the basic Model Law definition in different ways. Firstly, there are issues 
surrounding ‘non-insolvency’ winding up.  The laws in many countries contain provisions under 
which the affairs of a company may be wound up; its assets distributed and its legal existence 
brought to an end even though the company may not be in any way insolvent.  The winding up may 
be ordered on general public interest grounds, or perhaps on the basis that it is just and equitable 
to do so e.g. in situations where the company is small, tightly-knit and there are squabbles between 
the corporate controllers. 
It has been held in Australia that a winding-up order on the just and equitable ground, is a foreign 
proceeding within the Model Law because the power to wind up on this ground can be seen as part 
of a law relating to insolvency.76 Similarly, it has been held that an Australian members’ voluntary 
winding up - essentially a solvent liquidation - could be recognised under the US version of the 
Model Law - Chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy Code – and appropriate assistance given.77In a 
recent UK decision, in Re Agrokor,78 it was held that the court may recognise, under the UK version 
of the Model Law, Croatian insolvency proceedings in respect of a single debtor company opened 
for an entire group of companies in Croatia under a special Croatian group insolvency law; it did not 
matter that certain companies within the group were not actually insolvent. The court held that it 
was still a law relating to insolvency. This is a controversial decision, not least because the courts 
of Serbia and Montenegro have held that the Croatian group proceedings were not capable of 
recognition under their respective implementations of the Model Law.79 
 
                                                            
73 Article 2(a). Re Chow Cho Poon (Private) Ltd [2011] NSWSC 300, [2011] 249 FLR 315, at [51]. 
74 Article 2(e). 
75 In Re 19 Entertainment Ltd [2016] EWHC 1545 (Ch) US Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganisation 
proceedings were recognised in the UK under the Model Law and Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations as 
relevant foreign proceedings.  
76 Re Chow Cho Poon (Private) Ltd [2011] NSWSC 300; [2011] 249 FLR 315, at [51]. 
77 Re Betcorp Ltd (2009) 400 BR 266.  
78  [2017] EWHC 2791 (Ch). 
79  [2017] EWHC 2791 (Ch), para 70. 
  
These Australian, US and UK decisions might be justified on the basis that the foreign law under 
which the winding up is ordered can in general be characterised as a law relating to winding up 
even though the particular provisions under which winding up was ordered in the particular case are 
not confined to insolvency.80 
 
The second general point is that the different decisions may owe something to the different ways in 
which the Model Law has been adopted in different countries and the particular legislative tweaks.  
For instance, under s 101(23) of the US Bankruptcy Code foreign proceeding covers proceedings 
in a foreign country ‘under a law relating to insolvency or adjustment of debt’ whereas the UK version 
of the Model Law does not specifically define foreign proceedings to include proceedings for the 
adjustment of debts.81 The Singapore implementing legislation adopts the US approach in this 
respect.   
 
The US (and Singapore) approach facilitates the recognition of foreign schemes of arrangement. 
Schemes of arrangement have been part of the UK Companies Act since 1862 and they have been 
exported to other British Commonwealth countries including Singapore and Hong Kong where they 
have been used extensively in recent years as debt restructuring tools as well as being used in this 
manner in the UK.82 So-called creditor schemes need approval from a majority in number 
representing 75% in value of the class or classes concerned voting at relevant class meetings. 
Essentially there are three stages to the process including two separate court applications and the 
need to obtain court approval for the scheme. These separate steps, and the necessity of obtaining 
court sanction, are the reasons why at one stage, the scheme procedure was thought to be costly 
and cumbersome and little used. But from being the ugly child of the UK (and other) corporate 
restructuring scene, schemes of arrangement have blossomed and matured into becoming the star 
of the show. Schemes are not an insolvency procedure per se.  The law relating to schemes is 
contained in the Companies Act rather than the Insolvency Act.  Therefore, they carry no insolvency 
‘stigma’ and this may explain some of their popularity for companies encumbered by large debt 
burdens.83 
One might say that UK debt restructuring schemes have been proposed under a law that contains 
provisions for the adjustment of debt and therefore they are prima facie candidates for recognition 
under the US version of the Model Law.  Indeed, in a number of recent cases, UK schemes have 
                                                            
80 See however para 48 of the 2013 Revised Guide to Enactment of the Model Law: “Where a proceeding 
serves several purposes, including the winding up of a solvent entity, it falls [within] the Model Law only if the 
debtor is insolvent or in severe financial distress” and see also para 71 of the original 1997 Guide. 
81 Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006, SI 2006/1030, SI 2006/1030 Sch 1, reg 2(i). 
82  See generally C Pilkington, Schemes of Arrangement in Corporate Restructuring (2nd edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2017); G O’Dea, J Long and A Smyth, Schemes of Arrangement Law and Practice (Oxford University 
Press 2012); J Payne, Schemes of Arrangement; Theory, Structure and Operation (Cambridge University 
Press 2014).   
83 See also LC Ho, ‘Making and enforcing international schemes of arrangement’ (2011) 26 Journal of 
International Banking Law and Regulation 434; J Payne, ‘Cross-Border Schemes of Arrangement and Forum 
Shopping’ (2013) 14 European Business Organization Law Review 563. 
 
  
been recognised in the US under Chapter 15.84 What if the shoe is on the other foot and recognition 
is sought for a foreign scheme in the UK? The problem as far as UK  recognition is concerned is 
how the Model Law has been implemented in the UK – relevant foreign proceedings must be 
entered into under a law relating to insolvency and the scheme has not been made under a law 
relating to insolvency.85  But it might be that in a particular case the scheme could be recognised 
under other grounds such as the fact that it purported to amend debt obligation governed by the 
relevant foreign law.  Since the foreign law is the proper law of the contract, then in accordance with 
principles of private international law, the modification of debt obligations effected by the scheme 
would be recognised on that basis. 
 
The third general issue is the exclusion of particular types of undertaking from the application of the 
Model Law. The Guide to Enactment has acknowledged the possibility of sector specific exclusions 
e.g. in relation to banks or insurance companies. It pointed out that often these types of undertaking 
are subject to special insolvency regimes under national law and there may be vital regulatory and 
consumer protection policies at work such as the need to reinforce public confidence and to avoid 
a run on deposits.86 Be that as it may, the exclusions adopted in a particular country are quite 
specific to that country and the local implementing legislation should be read carefully to see what 
is in, and what is not.  
 
     4C. Avenues for extending cooperation to foreign proceedings– is the Model Law the only 
road? 
 
Article 7 of the Model Law suggests that it is only intended to provide threshold levels of assistance 
and that States are free to supplement this by providing additional assistance to a foreign insolvency 
representative.87 In its Guide to Enactment, UNCITRAL itself explains that the purpose of the Model 
Law is not to displace provisions in national legislation to the extent that they provide assistance 
that is additional to, or different from, the type of assistance dealt with in the Model Law.88   
                                                            
84 See A Walters,  “Giving Effect to Foreign Restructuring Plans in Anglo-US Private International Law” (2015)  
3 NIBLeJ 376 at 380 citing the observation of NY Bankruptcy Court Judge Sean Lane that “schemes have 
routinely been recognized as foreign proceedings, including cases in this court” and see also J Westbrook, 
“Ian Fletcher and the Internationalist Principle” (2015) 3 NIBLeJ 565. 
85 See Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006, SI 2006/1030 Sch 1, Art 2(i) which refers to a “collective 
judicial or administrative proceedings in a foreign State, including an interim proceeding, pursuant to a law 
relating to insolvency in proceeding the assets and affairs of the debtor are subject to control or supervision 
by a foreign court, for the purpose of reorganization or liquidation”. 
86 See, generally, Guide to Enactment of the Model Law (UNCITRAL 1997) at paras 60–65 and 
paras 55–60 of the Revised Guide to Enactment of the Model Law. 
87 Article 7. 
88 Paragraph 90 of the original (1997) Guide to Enactment of the Model Law and para 105 of the Revised 
2013 Guide. 
  
Some countries including the UK and Singapore have faithfully followed this approach. For instance, 
in the UK there are three statutory vehicles for international/cross-border cooperation in insolvency 
matters – the European Insolvency Regulation (while the UK remains an EU member state), the 
UNCITRAL Model Law and s 426 Insolvency Act 1986 which essentially provides for a form of 
enhanced insolvency co-operation between certain designated common law countries, and in 
addition, the common law to the extent that it has not been superseded in relation to particular 
matters. The US however, has struck a different note here.  It has been held that Chapter 15 of the 
Bankruptcy Code is the sole gateway for a US court to provide assistance to a foreign court and 
there is no residual common law discretion89 whereas under, for example, the Singapore version of 
the Model Law it is still possible to fall back on the common law. Chapter 15 in s 1507 makes the 
provision of any additional assistance contingent on the foreign proceedings satisfying the criteria 
for recognition under Chapter 15 in the first place. Chapter 15 has been spoken of as ‘a series of 
carefully crafted compromises’90 and it seems that limiting additional assistance is one of these 
compromises. 
       4D. Treatment of foreign creditors 
The Model Law in Article 13 provides that foreign creditors have the same right as domestic creditors 
to institute and participate in insolvency proceedings.  The common law does not discriminate on 
its face against foreign creditors as Lord Hoffmann observed in Cambridge Gas Transport 
Corporation v Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (of Navigator Holdings Plc).91 
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to make this point expressly since it provides clarity and transparency 
for foreign creditors and insolvency representatives.   
There is also a general provision in the Model Law that foreign creditors should not be ranked lower 
than the class of general non-preference domestic claims. 92It may that foreign creditors however, 
for example foreign preferential creditors, find that their claims do not have the same status in the 
foreign forum as they do in their home country and many States exclude foreign revenue claims 
totally from recognition in insolvency proceedings. Indeed, UNCITRAL in its guide to enactment 
acknowledges national sensitivities in this regard by giving States the leeway to continue the 
                                                            
          89 Re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund Ltd 374 B R 122 (2007) and 
affirmed (2008) 389 BR 325. For another US decision limiting the effect of the Model Law and Chapter 15 of 
the US Bankruptcy Code see Drawbridge Special Opportunities Fund LP v Barnet, 737 F 3d 238 (2d Cir 
2013). This case holds before foreign insolvency proceedings are entitled to recognition under Chapter 15, 
the debtor in respect of whom the foreign proceedings have been instituted must satisfy the s 109 Bankruptcy 
Code eligibility requirements in respect of the opening of substantive insolvency proceedings in the US. This 
limitation does not expressly appear in Chapter 15 nor in the Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations. In practice 
however the s 109 eligibility requirements should be easy to satisfy. The provision requires a debtor to have 
a domicile, a place of business, or property in the US. 
 
90 Judge Leif Clark ‘“Centre of Main Interests” Finally Becomes the Center of Main Interest in the Case 
Law’ (2008) 43 Texas International Law Journal Forum 14 at 17. 
91 [2006] UKPC 26, [2007] 1 AC 508 at para 16. 
92 Article 13(2). 
  
exclusion of foreign revenue claims.93   Many States including the US94, Australia95 and Singapore 
have exercised this ‘opt-out’ and have not used Model Law implementation to amend general 
domestic law and make foreign tax claims enforceable. In the UK, a different strategy was adopted 
and the opportunity was taken to overturn the long-established principle affirmed in Government of 
India v Taylor96 that a claim by, or on behalf of, a foreign State to recover taxes was unenforceable 
in the UK courts.97 
 
Certainly, foreign creditors are often disadvantaged by the opening of insolvency proceedings. 
These proceedings may be taking place in a faraway country according to a procedure and in a 
language with which they are not familiar. Foreign creditors may not be aware of the time limits for 
lodging claims nor of the proofs that have to be submitted. It may be that a translation of the claim 
into one of the official languages of the State where the proceedings have been opened is required, 
as well as the services of a foreign lawyer or other professional and these costs may render it 
uneconomical to submit a claim. “Due to high costs, creditors may choose to forgo a debt, especially 
when it involves a small amount of money. This problem mainly affects small and medium-sized 
businesses as well as private individuals.”98 
In a European Union context, in Case C-212/15 ENEFI v DGRFP,99 Advocate General Bobek noted 
that in practical terms cross-border creditors may typically have to overcome obstacles stemming 
from the geographical distance and the linguistic and legal differences between the State in which 
insolvency proceedings are opened and the State in which such creditors are based but he added 
                                                            
93 Original Guide to Enactment at paras 103–105 and revised guides at paras 118–120 and see the 
discussion in I Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law 2nd edn (OUP, 2005) at p 477.   
     94 Section 1513(b)(2)(B) of the US Bankruptcy Code provides that the admissibility and priority of a foreign 
tax claim is governed by any applicable tax treaty of the US, under the conditions and circumstances specified 
therein: 11 USC § 1513 (2012). The implementation of the Model Law in the US does not change US law on 
the (non)admissibility of foreign revenue claims. Some of the reasons for the exclusion were articulated by in 
British Columbia v Gilbertson, 597 F 2d 1161, 1165 (1979). It was suggested that requiring countries to 
enforce foreign tax claims would require some analysis of the tax claim, and could be embarrassing to the 
foreign State. US courts may not be able to understand and evaluate foreign tax claims and enforcing such 
claims would ‘have the effect of furthering the governmental interests of a foreign country, something which 
our courts customarily refuse to do’. For a general discussion see Jonathan M Weiss, “Tax Claims in 
Transnational Insolvencies: A “Revenue Rule” Approach” (2010) 30(1) Virginia Tax Review 261. 
95 Section 12 Australian Cross Border Insolvency Act 2008. From December 1, 2012 however, the position 
is more nuanced following Australia’s ratification of the OECD Convention on Mutual Administrative 
Assistance in Tax Matters. The Australian Commissioner of Taxation obliged to assist in the recovery of tax 
claims from a large number of foreign jurisdictions that are party to this Convention and, subject to certain 
conditions, the Commissioner is empowered to recover the foreign tax claim as if it were its own - see Practice 
Statement Law Administration 2011/13 Cross border recovery of taxation debts. 
96 [1955] AC 491. 
97 See Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 (UK) SI 2006/1030, sch 1, art 13(3). A foreign tax claim 
may still be challenged, however, on the basis that it is in the nature of a penalty.  
98 See Commission report - COM(2012) 743 -  at pp 16–17. 
99 ECLI:EU:C:2016:427 (Opinion of Advocate General); ECLI:EU:C:2016:841 (judgment of court).  
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that this was an inherent feature of cross-border insolvency proceedings, similar to difficulties that 
parties may encounter in cross-border litigation.100 
The Model Law in Article 14 contains certain concrete measures to alleviate the disadvantage that 
foreign-based creditors may suffer in practice. They must be notified individually of the proceedings 
unless the court considers that some other form of notification would be more appropriate or where 
the notification to local creditors is by advertisement by something equivalent. When notice of a right 
to lodge a claim is given to foreign creditors, the notification must indicate a reasonable time period 
for filing claims and set out a place for filing. These provisions are rather limited however, and 
certainly they do not establish a comprehensive procedural framework.  
The European Insolvency Regulation which governs recognition and coordination of insolvency 
proceedings within the European Union contains a more comprehensive set of provisions to 
facilitate the lodging of claims by foreign creditors.101 For instance, it provides that representation 
by a lawyer or another legal professional is not mandatory for the lodging of claims.102 Moreover, 
irrespective of shorter periods under national law, foreign creditors are given at least 30 days 
following publication of the notice of opening of proceedings in an insolvency register to lodge their 
claims.103 It is also the case that foreign creditors have to be informed if their claim is contested 
and given the opportunity of providing supplementary evidence to verify their claim.104 
      4E. Application of foreign law 
A controversial issue in the context of Model Law is what sort of relief may be available to a foreign 
insolvency representative and whether this includes the application of provisions of the relevant 
foreign law – an extra-territorial application of the foreign law to the recognizing State as it were.  
The Model Law is somewhat ambiguous on the point referring in Article 21(g) to the grant of any 
additional relief that may be available under the laws of the recognizing State.  This provision is 
more or less faithfully reproduced in some implementing States including Singapore.  The UK 
provision refers to ‘appropriate relief’’105  while the US Chapter 15 refers to additional relief that may 
be available to a US bankruptcy trustee subject to certain limitations.106 These limitations mean 
however, that a foreign insolvency representative cannot rely on US transactional avoidance law. 
Transactional avoidance is dealt with in Article 23 of the Model Law which gives a foreign 
representative the standing to invoke local laws on transactional avoidance.  Article 23 has been 
implemented in this way in the UK and Singapore but the US version of Article 23 provides that a 
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foreign representative only has the standing to invoke the US avoidance provisions where full, 
plenary bankruptcy proceedings have been commenced under Chapter 7 or 11 of the US 
Bankruptcy Code. Chapter 7 or 11 proceedings are likely to be significantly more expensive than 
Chapter 15 proceedings and there are certain foreign debtors, including foreign-incorporated 
insurance companies, specifically precluded from using Chapters 7 and 11.107 For this reason, in 
Re Condor Insurance Ltd108 a foreign representative sought to invoke Article 21 and use foreign 
fraudulent transfer law to invalidate a large transfer by the debtor company to a US affiliate. The 
company was in liquidation in Nevis, its ‘home’ jurisdiction, and the US Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
permitted the use of Nevis law to avoid the transfer in the Chapter 15 context. It held that the relevant 
foreign law could be used in this way. alluding to comity and the fact that debtors might otherwise 
be tempted to hide assets in the US out of the reach of the foreign jurisdiction. The court referred to 
the cost and inconvenience of full US bankruptcy proceedings, which in any event could not be 
opened in this case because of the express statutory prohibition in relation to foreign insurance 
companies. Its approach was to say that if the legislature wanted to bar all avoidance actions relying 
on foreign law, this could have been said expressly but the statute did not say this.109The court 
suggested that there was a ‘helpful marriage of avoidance and distribution whether the proceeding 
is ancillary applying foreign law or a full proceeding applying domestic law – a marriage that avoids 
the more difficult … rules of conflict law presented by avoidance and distribution decisions governed 
by different sources of law’.110In short, Chapter 15 permitted only avoidance actions relying upon 
foreign law whereas actions that relied on US law could only be brought under Chapter 7 or 11. 
It may be that the decision in Re Condor Insurance Co Ltd111 is best explained by the particular 
way in which the Mode Law has been implemented in the US and it does not really have any greater 
international significance.  This was essentially the approach taken in a UK context by Morgan J in 
in Re Pan Ocean Co Ltd.112 He pointed out that the legislative context and legislative history were 
different in the US and moreover, he suggested that the US court may have misinterpreted the 
background negotiations that led to the Model Law. Morgan J ruled that the UK version of Article 21 
did not permit the application of foreign law and that only domestic law should be considered in 
deciding what relief to extend to a foreign office holder. He rejected the view that the expression 
‘appropriate relief’ in Art 21 should be interpreted in a broad way that would permit the application 
of foreign insolvency law. A broad judicial discretion about which law to apply, tempered only by 
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considerations of ‘justice’, brought about increased uncertainty which militated against effective 
transaction planning and the accurate pricing of risk.  
In the UK, the Pan Ocean decision was reaffirmed in Bakhshiyeva v Sberbank of Russia113 where 
the court concluded that relief granted under the Model Law should not be allowed to undermine 
the long-established common law rule that the modification of English law governed obligations was 
a matter for English law rather than foreign law. If foreign insolvency or restructuring law purported 
to modify the English law governed rights and obligations of creditors without their consent or 
participation in the proceedings, then the English courts would not grant relief under the Model Law 
that would have this effect. 
 
5. Model Law regime – developments since it was first promulgated  
 
5A. Practice, judicial perspectives document, revised guide to enactment 
 
UNCITRAL’s work on cross border insolvency cooperation did not stop with the enactment of the 
Model Law in 1997.  Thus far, it has taken three specific measures and two more are in the pipeline; 
a Model Law on insolvency related judgments114 and also some additional provisions on groups of 
companies and cross-border insolvency proceedings.115The first specific measure is a practice 
guide on cross border cooperation116; the second a document setting out the judicial perspective 
on these matters117 and the third, a revised guide to enactment of the Model Law.  The Practice 
Guide is intended to provide information for insolvency practitioners and judges on how the practical 
aspects of cooperation and communication in cross-border cases might be managed. There is an 
illustration of the ways in which conflicts arising in such cases could be mitigated by the use of 
cross-border insolvency agreements specifically tailored for each case and for applicable law 
requirements. 
The Judicial Perspectives document was developed in response to requests from participants at 
biennial UNCITRAL/INSOL/World Bank multinational judicial colloquia for more information on the 
application and interpretation of the Model Law.118 It is intended to assist judges on questions arising 
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on an application for recognition under the Model Law. It identifies issues that may arise in the 
context of a recognition application or a request for cooperation and discusses the approaches 
taken by courts in different ‘Model Law’ countries.  
The third measure, the Revised Guide, developed from a US proposal to have more interpretative 
guidance on selected Model Law concepts. 119 The intention was that this guidance would contribute 
to the legislative history and provide background for understanding the scope and meaning of 
various Model Law provisions. It was considered that the Revised Guide should serve as a single 
source of guidance thereby eliminating any confusion that might result from the provision of 
commentary additional to the Original Guide, especially in situations where the commentary was 
not exactly in sync with, or elaborated upon, matters that has been already addressed in the Original 
Guide.120  Both the Revised Guide and the ideal behind its promulgation have however attracted 
criticism. It could be argued that because the Original Guide has been used by national 
policymakers, legislators and courts, now to amend the guidance appears problematic.  Pushing 
this argument to its logical conclusion, Model Law countries could, in future,  be divided into two 
separate groups; firstly, those with a version of the Model Law designed around the Original Guide 
and secondly, later adopters with a version of the Model Law conforming to the Revised Guide.121 
The Revised Guide, it seems, was intended as a vehicle to correct Model Law interpretations 
considered by the US delegation to be ‘erroneous’ but a more coherent, albeit politically more 
challenging, way of doing this is to alter either the Model Law provisions directly or else national 
implementing laws such as the US Chapter 15. Instead, the indirect route was taken of trying to 
change judicial interpretations by tampering with the Guide to Enactment. It may be that UNCITRAL 
is seeking to achieve a de facto amendment of the Model Law provisions in the name of 
reinterpretation. 
One area where there has been greater elaboration in the revised guide and an apparent attempt 
to alter judicial interpretations has been on timing issues.  Article 17 of the Model Law states that a 
foreign proceeding shall be recognised if it a foreign proceeding within Article 2 taking place in the 
State either where the debtor has its centre of main interests (COMI) or an establishment. Articles 2 
and 17 do not directly address the question whether the debtor must have its COMI or an 
establishment within State at the time of the opening of the relevant foreign proceedings or whether 
the relevant time is the time of the recognition application.  Neither was the matter considered 
squarely in the original guide but the revised guide makes it clear that the relevant date is the date 
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of commencement of the relevant foreign proceedings.  It suggests that adopting this date provides 
a test that can be applied with certainty to all insolvency proceedings.122 
The revised guide contradicts the approach adopted in the US where the dominant judicial view is 
that the relevant time is the time of application for Chapter 15 recognition rather than the time of 
commencement of the relevant foreign proceedings.123 The leading decision is that of the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals In Morning Mist v Krys124 but the court did however, add the rider that it 
could review the period between the commencement of the foreign proceedings and the application 
for recognition if there was an allegation that COMI had been manipulated in bad faith. The Morning 
Mist decision is based firmly on the Chapter 15 wording rather than on more general internationalist 
considerations with the court suggesting that if the US legislature had intended the courts to view 
the COMI determination through a look-back period or on a specific past date, it could easily have 
said so. The court said that only limited use could be made of international sources in resolving 
whether US courts should calculate COMI on the date of the Chapter 15 filing or in some other 
way.125  
The Morning Mist decision facilitates the recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings if there is a 
significant time gap between the commencement of the foreign proceedings and the recognition 
application since the commencement of the foreign proceeding is likely to bring about in a shift in 
the debtor’s activities to the State that opens the proceedings. Nevertheless, the pluses of the 
decision seem to be outweighed by the minuses.  The decision is unsatisfactory through creating 
international disharmony rather than the harmony and co-operation which is the goal of the Model 
Law. There is the possibility of conflicting decisions in different countries on the recognition of foreign 
insolvency proceedings depending on when a recognition application is made in that particular 
country. If a court determines COMI or an establishment, as the case may, by referring to the time 
of commencement of the foreign insolvency proceeding then this would create a universally fixed 
time and bring about greater certainty in the decision-making process.126 
 
5B. Judgments Model Law 
 
On insolvency-related judgements, UNCITRAL has noted that according to the UK Supreme Court 
in Rubin127, long standing common law rules for the recognition of foreign insolvency judgments 
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remained undisturbed by the UK’s adoption of the Model Law.  According to UNCITRAL, the case 
brought to light problems of a global nature. It noted that the Model Law did not provide an explicit 
solution with respect to the recognition and enforcement of insolvency-derived judgments.128  This 
had led to significant uncertainty and might have a chilling effect on the prospects of the Model Law 
gaining international acceptance. Therefore, it was considered by UNCITRAL to be an opportune 
time to tackle the recognition and enforcement of these types of judgments and this has now been 
done through a draft Model Law.129  
 
In providing for the recognition of insolvency related judgments, a number of approaches are 
possible.130  One approach is to stipulate that if insolvency proceedings are opened in either the 
COMI state or the State where the debtor has an establishment, then the court opening the 
insolvency proceedings also has jurisdiction in respect of insolvency related actions and other 
States should recognise judgments resulting from such actions.  This is basically the approach 
adopted in the European Insolvency Regulation (EIR) where recognition and enforcement extends 
to judgments handed down in any ‘action which derives directly from the insolvency proceedings 
and is closely linked with them, such as avoidance actions. 131 It does not matter for these purposes 
where the defendant in the avoidance or other insolvency related action was resident at the time 
that the judgment was handed down.132   
There is however an extensive body of jurisprudence under the EIR as to what constitutes an 
insolvency related action.133  The following categories of case have been held to fall into the realm 
of insolvency-related actions though the categories undoubtedly overlap: actions based on 
insolvency law that seek to fix liability on company officers134;  actions based on provisions particular 
to insolvency law or to insolvency-related adjustments of general legal provisions; actions based on 
insolvency law that seek to set aside pre-insolvency transactions entered into by the debtor135 and 
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actions challenging the exercise of a power or discretion by an insolvency representative.136  The 
following types of actions have been held however, not to be insolvency-related; actions by an 
insolvency representative seeking to establish the debtor’s ownership of property137 and actions 
based on general contract or commercial law that seek the recovery of monies allegedly owing to 
the debtor.138 
Another approach might be to say however, that any judgment handed down in the course of 
insolvency proceedings should be enforced if the defendant had some genuine link of substance to 
the State administering the insolvency proceedings.  Such an approach has found favour in Canada 
as the test for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments generally.  Leading decisions 
are those of the Supreme Court of Canada in De Savoye v Morguard Investments Ltd139 and 
Salndahna v Beals140. The court suggested that “the rules of private international law are grounded 
in the need in modern times to facilitate the flow of wealth, skills and people across state lines in a 
fair and orderly manner.” Moreover, the content of traditional rules “must be adjusted in the light of 
a changing world order”.  It was accepted that there were possible inconveniences arising from legal 
action against a natural or legal person in a State other than its place of domicile or residence but 
the court concluded that the best way to balance the interests of potential plaintiffs and defendants 
was to permit enforcement where actions had been brought in States with “a real and substantial 
connection” to the cause of action. 
The proposed new Model law allows for enforcement of foreign judgments in a broad range of 
circumstances and on the basis of a wide conception of relevant judgments. The proposed definition 
of an “insolvency-related foreign judgment” is broader than that under the EIR though the relevant 
judgment must have been issued on or after the commencement of the insolvency proceedings to 
which it relates.141   But alternative wording has also been floated that would more closely mirror 
the wording and concept of insolvency related judgements in the EIR.142  It remains to be seen 
what version or versions will finally emerge from the workings of UNCITRAL 
 
5C. Insolvency of enterprise groups 
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UNCITRAL has also been working on measures in relation to facilitating the cross-border insolvency 
of multinational enterprise groups and here the influence of the European Insolvency Regulation 
(EIR) has been evident.   
In traditional insolvency law, including cross-border insolvency, the focus is very much on the 
particular individual company and not on its possible status as a member of a group of companies.143 
International business however, tends to be conducted through networks of related companies 
incorporated in different jurisdictions with separate independent legal status.  This state of affairs 
can give rise to complicated legal wrangling when a financial group as a whole experiences financial 
difficulties.  The Lehman case in an example in point and in this situation we had separate 
insolvency proceedings instituted where different members of the financial group were incorporated 
or doing business.  In other cases, it may be possible to pre-empt the possibility of separate local 
insolvency proceedings by opening main insolvency proceedings in the State where all group 
members could be deemed to have their COMI even if they are incorporated or doing business 
elsewhere. This approach may be referred to as the procedural consolidation of insolvency 
proceedings. 
The case law in some European Union (EU) States has embraced the idea of procedural 
consolidation despite some unsympathetic jurisprudence from the European court itself including in 
the Mediasucre144 case where the court rejected the proposition that a single COMI could 
automatically be inferred from the intermixing of the property of two related companies.  A French 
Court has however said that  the  ’analysis of the case law of the various Member States shows that 
courts adopt a pragmatic approach tending to allow streamlining of strongly integrated groups of 
companies.’ 145 This approach was effectively adopted in the UK in cases like Re Daisytek-ISA Ltd146 
where the court held that all the members of a group of companies had a common UK COMI despite 
the fact that the companies had been incorporated in different countries.   
The UK courts have gone further in cases like Re Collins and Aikman147 and Re Nortel 
Networks148and developed the notion of ‘synthetic’ insolvency proceedings.  The general scheme 
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under the EIR is that main insolvency proceedings are opened where the debtor has its COMI and 
secondary proceedings may be opened where the debtor has an establishment.  In many cases the 
motivation behind the opening of insolvency proceedings is a desire by certain creditors to advance 
claims that would be regarded as preferential under local law but not under the law of the main 
insolvency proceedings. In Re Collins and Aikman it was held that UK insolvency practitioners could 
respect observe promises made to creditors in other EU States that local priorities would be upheld 
in return for not opening secondary proceedings in these States.  The local creditors effectively got 
the benefits of secondary proceedings without the trouble of having to open them.  These secondary 
proceedings were in effect ‘synthetic’ or ‘virtual’ rather than actual. The revised version of the EIR149 
generalises and ‘Europeanises’ some of the practices developed by the UK courts in these cases 
and the UNCITRAL initiative on insolvency of cross-border groups further develops and 
internationalises these practices by including a provision sanctioning ‘synthetic’ insolvency 
proceedings for members of what are called enterprise groups.150    
There are other ‘borrowings’ in the UNICTRAL groups initiative from the ‘recast’ EIR most notably 
in the provisions for cooperation between courts in different countries administering insolvency 
proceedings in respect of enterprise group members and also for the coordination of such 
proceedings.  The court also takes the notion of ‘group coordination proceedings’ from the EIR 
though in the UNCITRAL context these are referred to as planning proceedings. These are main 
proceedings commenced in respect of an enterprise group member which are a necessary and 
integral part of a group insolvency solution.  A group representative has to be appointed and one or 
more additional group members have to participate for the purpose of developing and implementing 
the group solution.  An “enterprise group” is taken to mean two or more enterprises that are 
interconnected by control or significant ownership with “control” meaning the capacity to determine, 
directly or indirectly, the operating and financial policies of an enterprise. The group insolvency 
solution is defined as a set of proposals for the reorganization, sale, or liquidation of some or all of 
the assets or operations of one or more group members and with the goal of preserving and 
maximizing the overall combined value of the group members as a whole. 
Group coordination or planning proceedings appear praiseworthy in their aspirations.151  There is 
no obligation to participate and a would-be participant can even effectively opt out at a later stage.  
It may be however, that the voluntary nature of the regime means that they are unlikely to be much 
used in practice though they may have a use in so-called ‘big ticket’ cases like Lehman where  there 
is a high degree of coordination at the outset between the different insolvency proceedings in 
different states appears appropriate and necessary. Working relationships in particular between 
insolvency representatives will have however to be good to ensure that potentially valuable 
                                                            
149 Articles 38(2) and 36. 
150 See Chapter 5, Articles 21-23 of the draft legislative provisions in the UNCITRAL document  
A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.146 - Facilitating the cross-border insolvency of multinational enterprise groups: draft 
legislative provisions 
151 For discussion of the cross-border insolvency of multinational enterprise groups at UNCITRAL level – 
see the Working Paper A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.128 available at www.uncitral.org/. 
  
procedural tools such as group coordination or planning proceedings do not become means for 
accentuating conflicts and leading to increased transaction costs. 
The EU influence on UNCITRAL drafts and initiatives begs the question as to why UNCITRAL does 
not go further and develop the Model Law into something much more akin to the European 
Insolvency Regulation (EIR).152The EIR is a much more comprehensive and extensive legal 
instrument than the Model Law.  For instance, under the EIR recognition of insolvency proceedings 
opened in another EU Member State is automatic153 whereas under the Model Law it is dependent 
upon an application to the court.  Although the assumption under the Model Law is that main 
insolvency proceedings should take place where the debtor has its COMI and “non-main” 
proceedings in States where the debtor has an establishment, the Model Law does not directly 
allocate jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings.  The existing national jurisdictional rules remain 
in place and the mere fact that a debtor may have assets, or even its COMI, in a particular State 
does not, in itself, confer jurisdiction on that State to open insolvency proceedings. It depends on 
the relevant national law applicable to that case. It is the position under the EIR that insolvency 
proceedings have the same effect in other EU States as they have in the law of the insolvency 
forum154, whereas under the Model Law the consequences of recognition depend on the law of the 
recognising State. Moreover, the Model Law does not make provision for conflict of law rules.  It 
does not purport to say which law should govern insolvency proceedings that are opened in a 
particular State whereas the EIR contains detailed conflict of law rules.155 
The EIR and the Model Law spring from very different multilateral entities.  The EIR springs from 
the European Union – an entity consisting of (now) 28 European States with strong supra-national 
institutions including an executive, a parliament and a Central Bank where the Member States had 
agreed to pool their sovereignty and in the words of the foundational treaty had agreed to work 
towards an ever closer union.156  The Model Law emanates from UNCITRAL, a United Nations 
body where the link between Member States is much more amorphous and diffuse.  It does not 
seem reasonable to assume that measures which work well in an EU context would have the same 
cachet and appeal in the context of UNCITRAL with its much larger and more diverse membership. 
This observation fits in with empirical evidence to the effect that the transplanting of legal ideas from 
one state to another works better when there is some fit between the imported law and local 
conditions.157 
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The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency can be counted as a moderate success. It 
has been adopted by over 40 jurisdictions including the major common law countries such as the 
US158, UK159, Canada160, Australia161 and New Zealand.  It has also been adopted by new and 
emerging economic powerhouses in Asia such as Japan, Korea and most recently Singapore.  But 
China has not yet embraced the Model Law nor have the major trading nations in Western European 
such as Germany and France though there are some European implementations apart from the UK. 
The Model Law has not yet achieved the same level of international acceptance as other UNCITRAL 
instruments such as for instance, the Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods162 but 
neither has it proved as unpopular as the 2001 New York Convention on the Assignment of 
Receivables in International Trade which has only adoptions and none of which are major trading 
nations. The 2001 New York Convention has not yet entered into force and may never enter into 
force.  One might be sceptical about international harmonisation efforts and such scepticism comes 
through in an even stronger vein in the comments of the former UK Law Lord, Lord Hobhouse, who 
has commented that such instruments163 
“are inevitably and confessedly drafted as multi-cultural compromises between different schemes 
of law. Consequently they will normally have less merit than most of the individual legal systems 
from which they have been derived. They lack coherence and consistency. They create problems 
about their scope. They introduce uncertainty where no uncertainty existed before. They probably 
deprive the law of those very features which enable it be an effective tool for the use of international 
commerce.” 
One might respond to Lord Hobhouse by saying that there are examples of good and bad products 
of harmonisation.  There is no such thing as the perfect draft and while it is easy to pick to pieces 
the open texture and linguistic infelicities of international instruments, purely domestic law may 
suffer no less from obscurity, verbosity and general bad drafting. 
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In relation to the Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency, one might add it is very much an exercise 
in realism and the art of the possible.164 The intention was to bring about genuine, ‘real world’ 
improvements in the practical administration of insolvency cases. The harmonisation efforts, 
instead of being thinly spread, were concentrated in key areas such as cooperation between courts 
in states where the debtor’s assets were located; providing foreign creditors and foreign insolvency 
representatives with access to local courts as well as recognising certain orders issued by foreign 
courts. The Preamble to the Model Law sets the overall tone for the instrument and enunciates 
certain policy objectives ranging from the general (greater legal certainty for trade and investment) 
to the particular including fair and efficient administration of cross-border insolvencies with 
protection for the interests of debtor, creditors and other interested parties; maximising the value 
of the debtor’s assets and facilitating the rescue of financially troubled businesses with the 
consequence of protecting investment and preserving employment. Moreover, the Model Law is 
‘soft law’ which means that implementing States may choose to implement it in different ways and 
States have taken advantage of this freedom as the different method and wording of 
implementation instruments in the US, UK, Australia and Singapore shows. 
The Model Law undoubtedly has its limitations in terms of scope.  It does not, for example, explicitly 
deal with the enforcement of insolvency related judgments nor with the application of foreign law 
in the implementing State.  The latter point has important implications as to whether the purported 
modification of foreign law governed obligations in the course of insolvency or restructuring 
proceedings will be recognised in the foreign State whose law prima facie governs the obligations, 
assuming of course that the foreign State has implemented the Model Law. The recognition of 
insolvency related judgements will be dealt with by UNCITRAL in a new Model Law.  Nevertheless 
it would be unwise to assume that the future path of cross-border insolvency law is, or should, all 
be towards the path of further harmonisation.  In the 1990s with the collapse of the former Soviet 
Union; the fall of the Berlin Wall as well as the Asian Financial Crisis, many legal scholars assumed 
that corporate law including corporate insolvency and restructuring law was converging towards a 
neo-American model.  The global financial crisis and the rise of China as an economic super power 
has disturbed some of these assumptions.165   We live in a complex, variegated world and future 
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